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Abstract
The effect of regulation on the property-liability insurance
industry is analyzed in this research. The applicability of four
theories of regulation, capture, minimization of conflict, maximization
of political support, and employment pattern, are tested by use of a
simultaneous equations system. Results demonstrate that the effects of
regulation on homeowners and automobile insurance differ. None of the
tested theories adequately explains regulation for both lines.

The property-liability insurance industry provides a unique setting
for a case study for regulatory economics. The industry is composed of
2994 insurers of which approximately 900 insurers that operate on a
national scale account for a vast majority of all business. Thus, the
composition of the industry is relatively similar from state to state.
Since insurance is regulated at the state level fifty-one different
2
regulatory systems have developed.
Significant differences exist in the form of regulation among states.
At one extreme states run insurance monopolies for certain coverages,
whereas completely unregulated environments exist at the other end of
the spectrum. In between the two extremes are differing requirements
for regulatory approval of rates and policy forms. As a result of the
national scope of the insurance industry and similarities in the compo-
sition of the market in all states, differences in market structure and
market performance by state are likely caused by the form of regulation.
The usual problem in formulating and testing theories of organizational
decision making for regulatory agencies is the difficulty in obtaining
comparable organizations for analysis. This comparability problem is
solved by analysis of the property-liability insurance industry regula-
tory system.
A wide range of articles have focused on the effect of rate regula-
tion in the property-liability insurance industry. Harrington surveys
3
this literature and summarizes the general results. No definitive
conclusion can be drawn from the research to date, in part since so few
articles have attempted to test regulatory theories. Several studies
do apply capture theory (see below) to the property-liability insurance
-2-
industry, and arrive at conflicting conclusions. Richard Ippolito ana-
lyzed the effects of automobile insurance rate regulation by comparing
experience in open competition states against experience in all other
4
states, and found capture theory was contradicted. James Walter
analyzed the performance of a sample of stockholder owned property-
liability insurers during the period 1966 to 1976 and concluded that
insurance regulation resulted in higher underwriting profit margins
than would occur in a fully competitive environment, supporting capture
theory. William Petersen analyzed the causes of interstate differen-
ces in the market performance of the private passenger automobile
insurance industry, concentrating on the impact of regulatory and sta-
tutory constraints. The regulatory constraints are recognized as
endogenous variables, influenced by political, economic, and demographic
conditions within a state. Four theoretical models of political beha-
vior, Capture Model, Interest Group Model, Consumer Model, and Ideology
Model, are proposed to explain the relationship among the structure of
a state, the regulatory system, and market performance. The findings
of the Petersen study in regard to the models of political behavior
reject the Capture Model, support the Consumer Model, and provide mixed
results for the Interest Group Model and the Ideology Model.
The relationship between the type of rate regulatory law in a state
and profitability for various lines of business has been analyzed pri-
marily by regressing the loss ratio against the type of regulation and
other explanatory variables. The simple regression methodology treats
the type of regulation as an exogenous variable not affected by the
other explanatory variables. This assumption is not valid. The type
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of rate regulatory law in effect in a state is influenced by many of the
same factors that affect profitability. The selection of a rate regula-
tory law for a state is not a random occurrence but a political process
that depends on variables within a state, influences from outside the
state, and, potentially, even on the profitability itself. Extremely
profitable or unprofitable experience under one system of rate regula-
tion may provide the impetus for a state to adopt another form of rate
regulation.
Therefore, a more accurate model of the relationship between pro-
fitability and the type of rate regulation is a simultaneous equations
system, under which both underwriting profitability and the type of
regulation are endogenous variables. Petersen used this technique in
his analysis of the private passenger automobile insurance market, but
o
a number of data problems exist in this study. Although many of the
state variables, including the loss ratio, have annual values, other
variables including the per capita income, population density, average
hospital charges, and wage rates represent a single value for all four
years in the study. Other significant factors, such as state infla-
tion, population growth, and industry concentration, were omitted.
The purpose of this paper is to apply the correct estimation pro-
cedure of a simultaneous equations system to both automobile and home-
owners insurance to test three established theories of regulation.
Additionally, a new theory of regulation, termed employment pattern,
will be explained and tested.
-4-
Theories of Regulation
Four theories of regulation are presented in this section. Three
9
of these theories, Stigler's capture theory, Joskow's minimization of
conflict theory, and Peltzman's maximization of political support
theory, have been formulated and tested in the literature of regula-
tion. The employment pattern theory, although alluded to in prior
12
research, is proposed and developed in this article. Each theory
hypothesizes a certain pattern of behavior of regulatory bodies. These
patterns are not mutually exclusive; different theories can result in
similar regulatory actions under certain circumstances.
Capture theory proposes that regulators have one interest group,
the regulated industry, to contend with and will, over time, adopt a
pattern of behavior that favors that group. This favoritism is expected
to occur regardless of economic conditions, the importance or cost of
the regulated product, the existence or strength of other interest
groups, or the career paths of the regulators. Regulated industries
are expected to benefit from regulation. In an industry such as the
property-liability insurance industry in which regulation varies by
state, capture theory would be supported if profitability were higher
in states with restrictive regulation and in states with elected insur-
ance commissioners where the monetary support of the industry could be
directly provided.
Joskow's minimization of conflict theory recognizes the influence
of multiple interest groups rather than the one group considered in
capture theory. Specifically, the influence of consumers is recognized.
Under this theory the behavior of the regulatory body depends on the
-5-
pressure applied by the different interest groups. In circumstances
under which consumers are assumed not to become involved in the regula-
tory process, which include steady or declining prices and the avail-
ability of an acceptable range of products or services, the expected
behavior of the regulatory body is the same as under capture theory.
However, in situations in which the consumers are interested in regula-
tory issues, the minimization of conflict theory expects regulation
to reduce profitability in response to consumer pressure. Thus, the
tradeoff between industry interests and consumer interests determines
regulatory policy. The ability of an interest group to organize into
a cohesive force varies by state. Consumer groups can organize more
effectively in urban areas whereas a more highly concentrated industry
increases the ability of business to organize. The minimization of
conflict theory expects profitability to increase with the concentration
ratio and to decrease with the level of urbanization in a state. This
theory cannot predict a sign for the effect of regulation or of
electing the insurance commissioner, as capture theory does, since the
actions of the regulatory body may either increase or decrease profit-
ability depending on interest group pressure.
Peltzman's maximization of political support theory of regulation
recognizes not only the existence of different interest groups but also
different degrees of involvement by the groups depending on economic
conditions, price levels, and demand and cost changes. Whereas Joskow's
theory focuses on the size of an interest group and a condition that
determines if the group will become involved in regulatory proceedings,
Peltzman's theory allows for differing degrees of involvement. The
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objective of the regulator is assumed to be the creation of the largest
possible coalition of support; it follows that regulatory actions are
taken to build this support. Unlike capture theory, this theory does
not expect the existence of regulation to increase profitability in
all circumstances. In economic recessions, regulation is expected to
increase the profitability of an industry. However, in periods of
expansion, regulation is expected to reduce profitability. For a given
line of insurance, regulation is expected to exert a positive influence
on profitability in years in which the industry is experiencing unpro-
fitable market conditions and to have a dampening effect on profitability
in years in which the industry is achieving a higher level of profit-
ability.
The foregoing theories of regulation all assume that regulators act
to achieve an objective in their own self interest. In capture theory
the regulator seeks to gain favor with the regulated industry. In the
minimization of conflict theory the regulator seeks to avoid controversy
by taking the path of least resistance. In the maximization of politi-
cal support theory the regulator attempts to continue in office. The
theory proposed in this article, termed employment* pattern , also assumes
that the regulator acts in his own self interest, but the objective of
the regulator is not assumed to be one dimensional. Under the employ-
ment pattern theory, the objectives of regulators are expected to vary
depending on the interests of the regulator. The prior employment of
a regulator is a potential influence on regulatory actions. An- indivi-
dual could be expected to reflect the perspectives and biases of the
interest group with which he or she has been associated. Future
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employment prospects could also affect the regulatory process as regu-
lators attempt to curry the favor of potential employers. One criti-
cism leveled at insurance regulation is the degree of "revolving door"
13
appointments between the industry and insurance departments. Con-
versely, commissioners intent on moving to other public sector employ-
ment, either elected or appointed positions, could seek to gain favor-
able publicity at the expense of the insurance industry. However,
regulators who view the regulatory position as a career in itself should
be expected to regulate differently from those who view the position as
a stepping-stone to another job. Career employees, considering their
employment with the regulatory agency as a permanent position, would
have as an objective the survival of the agency. The transient regula-
tor is not solely or even necessarily concerned with the survival of
the regulatory agency or employment security in his or her current
position. The transient regulator, in considering future employment in
a different capacity, would have the objective to develop a clientele
that can be useful to the regulator in the future. Depending on the
career plans of the transient regulator, the clientele can be the regu-
lated industry where more lucrative employment may exist, a segment
of the public whose support could prove valuable, or a group that the
regulator can utilize to gain favorable publicity. The implications
of this objective of the transient regulator depend on the clientele
group.
To test the employment pattern theory, regulators are classified
into categories based on tenure in office and career paths. These
-8-
classif ications are expected to affect the profitability of the in-
dustry. Specifically, regulators coming from or going to the insurance
industry are expected to regulate in a manner that increases profit-
ability levels and regulators going to other public sector jobs are
expected to reduce profitability levels. Under the employment pattern
theory the existence of restrictive regulation, the relative size and
concern of interest groups, the economic conditions, and the price and
cost determinants are not expected to influence the outcome of regula-
tion as much as the individual interests of the regulator.
Description of Data
Empirical research on the effect of regulation on the insurance
industry requires the use of data derived from a variety of sources.
This study provides a cross sectional test using the period 1973 through
1980 including variables for the type of regulation, market structure
and performance, economic and demographic factors, and characteristics
of insurance regulators.
Insurance rate regulatory laws vary widely from state to state, but
tend to follow six major classifications: mandatory rate level, prior
approval, modified prior approval, file-and-use, use-and-f ile, and
14
open competition. In this study, the first three types are con-
sidered restrictive regulation and the latter three competitive rating.
Market performance is measured by the underwriting profit margin
by line of insurance for each state. The underwriting profit margin is
calculated by:
-9-
Incurred Losses Operating Expenses
Earned Premium Written Premium
Written premium represents the total premium charged for policies issued
in a year. However, insurance coverage can extend into a year other
than the one in which the premium was written. Earned premium represents
an amortization of written premium over the coverage period. The deno-
minators differ to reflect the fact that losses are distributed through-
out the coverage period while expenses occur disproportionately at the
inception of the policy. Incurred losses and earned premium reflect
individual state experience. The ratio of operating expenses to written
premium, termed the expense ratio, is a weighted average (by market
share) of the expense ratio of each insurer operating in a state.
For a state with an unusually high proportion of insurers with low
expense ratios, this calculation produces a lower state expense ratio
than the countrywide expense ratio for the industry. Prior studies
based on the loss ratio as a measure of market performance introduce
distortions, since insurers with low expense ratios can achieve accept-
able levels of profitability with higher loss ratios than other insurers
I 6
would accept.
Market structure is measured by two variables, the three firm con-
centration ratio and the direct writers' market share. The concentra-
tion ratio reflects the industry's cohesiveness , which is expected to
influence lobbying incentive and power. Direct writers, which market
policies through their own agents or employees, generally operate at
lower expense ratios than independent agency insurers. Historically
favoring competitive forms of rate regulation, they are expected to
-10-
influence the type of regulatory law in states in which their represen-
tation is high.
Economic variables included in this analysis are the per capita
19
income and the inflation rate. If a state's economy is functioning
smoothly, regulatory intervention in the market may not be considered
necessary. On the other hand, dissatisfaction with the local economy
may lead the populace to. turn to regulatory solutions to perceived
market failure. The per capita income in a state deflated by the
national consumer price index is included in the analysis and can be
expected to influence the type of regulation. A high inflation rate in
a state should decrease profitability regardless of the type of regula-
tion. Since the rate of inflation is not consistent in all areas of
the country, a variable based on changes in regional cost of living
indices representing the inflation rate within a state, is included in
the analysis of profitability as affected by the type of regulation.
Demographic varibles include the population growth rate, the per-
cent of the population residing in urban areas, and the age distri-
20
bution. The population growth rate could impact profitability within
a state. For automobile insurance, new insureds consistently produce
more losses than insureds that have been with the same company for
21
several years. For homeowners insurance, new insureds tend to be
more profitable for insurers since coverage limits more closely reflect
the value of property than policies purchased several years ago on
which coverage may not have been increased to reflect increased replace-
ment costs. The population growth rate for a state reflects the pro-
portion of new insureds within a state as well as changes in traffic
-11-
and population density that may not be representative of the experience
period used to establish rate levels.
The population growth rate is also an indirect measure of the eco-
nomic health of a state as citizens move to more attractive economic
climates, a phenomenon colloquially termed "voting with their feet."
A high rate of growth is most likely to occur in states with growing
economies, although the cause and effect of this correspondence is un-
clear. The population growth rate is likely to influence the type of
regulation.
The percent of the population residing in urban areas can affect
the type of regulation by providing support for consumer groups inter-
ested in strengthening regulatory control. This value is used as a
proxy for the ability of consumers to generate conflict for the regu-
lator in testing the minimization of conflict theory of regulation.
The urban population can also influence underwriting profitability
if characteristics inherent in urban living that affect profitability
differ significantly from non-urban residence.
The age distribution of the population is another factor that can
affect the analysis. For automobile insurance, the percent of the
population in the high risk category, youthful operators, can influence
the loss ratio to the extent that rating factors are not properly
adjusted for the greater loss exposure. For homeowners insurance, the
percent of the population over age 65 could affect profitability if
this segment of the population has, based on a greater propensity to
be in the residence as a result of retirement or other reasons, a dif-
ferent exposure to crime or fire loss.
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The insurance commissioner characteristics included in this study
are:
1« the type of job held by the commissioner prior to assuming a
position with the insurance department;
2. the type of job held by the commissioner after leaving office;
3. whether the commissioner has made the insurance department a
career rather than a stepping stone to another position;
4. the length of time the commissioner has been in office;
5. whether the commissioner was elected or appointed to office.
All the foregoing characteristics are expected to influence the type
of regulation. All characteristics except the length of time in office
are expected to affect industry profitability.
Information about insurance commissioners is obtained from a variety
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of sources. Each commissioner is classified based on the type of
employment prior to assuming a position with the insurance department
on the following criteria:
la if the commissioner has previously been employed by the insur-
ance industry at any time in his or her career, the classifica-
tion insurance industry is applied;
2. if the commissioner came directly from an academic position,
the academic classification is applied;
3. if the commissioner has no insurance industry experience but
has previously held full time public sector positions, either
elective or appointive, the public sector classification is
applied;
-13-
4. if the commissioner's entire career has been in business, but
not insurance, the classification business other than insurance
23
is applied;
5. if the commissioner served his or her entire prior career in
the insurance department or in the military, the classification
public sector is applied.
Post-commissioner employment is classified similarly to pre-
insurance department employment, but the commissioner could still be in
office as commissioner, or be retired, or deceased. The classification
for post-commissioner employment is based on the position the com-
missioner assumed after leaving office, or, if that information is not
available, the position held as of January, 1982.
The employment orientation of the commissioner while in office is
also hypothesized to affect regulation and market performance. The
standard used to determine employment orientation is whether the com-
missioner considers the position as a career or as a stepping stone to
another position. The commissioner is assumed to consider the position
as transient unless one of the following criteria is met:
1. the commissioner remains in office more than seven years;
2. the commissioner was previously employed in the insurance
department for at least three years or all of his or her
working career.
The insurance commissioner is also classified based on whether the
position is elective or appointed, and the natural log of time in
24
office. A commissioner is assumed to affect a year's experience only
if he or she is in office at the beginning of the year. A commissioner
-14-
that assumes office in January is not considered to influence that
year's experience but may affect later years depending on tenure in
office. The reason for this determination is the lag inherent in
insurance pricing and loss experience.
Structure of Empirical Tests
Based on insurance ratemaking techniques and the evolution of
insurance regulation, the homeowners underwriting profit margin in a
state is hypothesized to be a function of the following characteristics
1. type of regulation;
2. inflation rate;
3. population growth rate;
4. percent of population residing in urban areas;
5. percent of population over age 65;
6. three firm concentration ratio;
7. direct writers' market share;
8. method of selecting the insurance commissioner;
9. employment pattern of the insurance commissioner;
10. employment orientation of the insurance commissioner;
11. indicator based on calendar year to proxy omitted influences
varying over time.
The type of regulation in effect in a state is hypothesized to be a
function of the following characteristics:
1. underwriting profit margin;
2. population growth rate;
3. percent of population residing in urban areas;
4. per capita income;
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5. three firm concentration ratio;
6. direct writers' market share;
7. method of selecting the insurance commissioner;
8. number of years the insurance commissioner has been in office;
9. employment pattern of the insurance commissioner;
10. employment orientation of the insurance commissioner.
The structural model of the simultaneous equations system is based
on these hypothesized relationships, and can be formulated as follows
(the variables are defined in Table 1):
(1) UPM = a + b REG + c INF + d PG + e URB + f OV65 + g CR
s s r s s s s
+ h DWMS + i EL + j PREII + k PREPUB + 1 PREAC
s s s s s
+ m POSTII + n POSTPUB + o CAREER + p YR74 + q YR75
s s s
r
+ r YR76 + s YR77 + t YR78 + u YR79 + v YR80
(2) REG = a + b UPM + c PG + d URB + e PCIA + f CR + g DWMS
s s s s s s s
+ h EL + i LNEXP + j PREPUB + k POSTPUB + 1 CAREER
s s s s s
The fitted values of the reduced form solution for the first stage
regression, termed UPM, are both correlated with the variable UPM and,
by construction, uncorrelated with the error term. Thus, UPM is an
appropriate instrumental variable for UPM in the structural model spe-
'
cified above for the type of regulation.
Multiple probit analysis is used to obtain an instrumental variable
for the type of regulation, since the dependent variable in the function
is a binary choice variable. Probit analysis, one method for dealing
with binary choice models, assumes residuals have a multivariate normal
distribution, so independence is not required. Probit is preferable to
-16-
logit since it allows Che introduction of additional alternatives, such
as other classifications of rate regulation, and does not require in-
dependence of irrelevant alternatives required by logit. In the reduced
form solution for this relationship an indicator variable, I, is used
to replace the dummy variable representing the type of regulation. The
relationship between the type of regulation and I can be expressed:
I 2
(3) Pr[REG =l|l ] = (1//27) / e
" (1/2)u
du
s ' s
'
—oo
(4) Pr[REG =0|l ] = 1 - Pr[REG =l|l ]
s ' s s ' s
where Pr = probability
The fitted values of this analysis, termed I, are used as the
instrumental variable for the type of regulation in the structural
model of profitability. The second stage regression, expressing the
relationship between the underwriting profit margin and the type of
regulation, is the same as equation (1) except I replaces REG :
s s
(5) UPM = a + b I + c INF + d PG + e URB + f OV65 + g CR
s s r s s s s
+ h DWMS + i EL + 1 PREII + k PREPUB + 1 PREAC
s s
J
s s s
+ m POSTII + n POSTPUB + o CAREER + p YR74 + q YR75
s s s
+ r YR76 + s YR77 + t YR78 + u YR79 + v YR80
The second stage multiple probit analysis, expressing the relation-
ship between the type of regulation and profitability is the same as
equation (2) except UPM replaces UPM .
s s
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The results of this simultaneous equations system, solved with
empirical data, are used to test the various theories of regulation.
Capture theory indicates that restrictive regulation should benefit
the insurance industry. The underwriting profit margin is expected
to be higher in states that regulate rates and in states with elected
insurance commissioners. Capture theory would be supported if the
coefficient of the indicator variable for restrictive rate regulatory
laws, b_ in equation 5, and the coefficient of the variable indicating
that the commissoner is elected, _i_ in equation 5, were greater than
zero.
Joskow's theory of regulation would be supported if the power of
interest groups were found to influence profitability. The underwriting
profit margin is expected to decrease as the ability of consumers to
form interest groups is facilitated; the underwriting profit margin
should increase as the insurance industry finds it easier to form a
cohesive force. The minimization of conflict theory of regulation
would be supported if the coefficient of the urbanization variable, e_
in equation 5, were less than zero and the coefficient of the con-
centration ratio,
_g_ in equation 5, were greater than zero.
Peltzman's theory of regulation hypothesizes that regulators act as
stabilizers to provide producer protection in recessions and consumer
protection in expansions. For the insurance industry this theory
suggests that regulation should tend to increase the underwriting pro-
fit margin in unprofitable years and to reduce it in profitable years.
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To test this theory the system of equations is run separately for un-
profitable years and for profitable years. Peltzman's theory would be
supported if the coefficient of the indicator variable for regulation,
b_ in equation 5, were greater than zero for unprofitable years and less
than zero for profitable years.
The employment pattern theory recognizes the ability of individual
regulators to influence outcomes toward the bias of the individual
regulator. The variables pre- and post-insurance commissioner employ-
ment and the employment orientation of the insurance commissioner are
expected to produce measurable effects. Specifically, this theory would
be supported if the coefficients of the variables indicating that the
insurance commissioner worked in the insurance industry, j_ and _m in
equation 5, were greater than zero, thus increasing the profitability,
if the coefficient of the variable indicating that the insurance com-
missioner moved to another public sector position, jn_ in equation 5,
were less than zero, reducing profitability, or if the coefficient of
the variable indicating that the commissioner considered the position
permanent, _o_ in equation 5, were significantly different from zero,
indicating career and transient regulators function differently.
Homeowners Insurance Results
The foregoing regressions were run for homeowners experience for
the period 1973 through 1980, with each year considered a separate
observation of a state. All states and the District of Columbia are
included. This period provides a potential sample size of 408. Infor-
mation is not available to classify the experience of the insurance
-19-
commissioner for 39 instances. After eliminating the observations with
missing data, a sample of 369 is available to fit the system of equa-
tions. The data are summarized in Table 2.
The results of the first stage regression are shown in Table 3 and
of the first stage multiple probit in Table 4. The population growth
rate, the adjusted per capita income, and whether the insurance com-
missioner is elected are highly significant and positively correlated
with the underwriting profit margin. The prior employment classifica-
tion of the insurance commissioner for insurance industry is negatively
correlated with the underwriting profit margin. The three firm con-
centration ratio and whether the insurance commissioner is elected are
positively correlated with the probability of restrictive rate regula-
tory laws. The population growth rate, the direct writers' market
share, the length of time in office of the insurance commissioner, and
the prior employment classifications of insurance industry, public sec-
tor and academic are negatively correlated with the probability of
restrictive rate regulatory laws. The correlations resulting from the
first stage regression and multiple probit, although important to under-
stand the long run structure of the relationship between restrictive
rate regulatory laws and profitability, are not, by themselves, able to
support or refute prior expectations or theories of regulation. The
relevant coefficients for hypothesis testing are the results of the
second stage regression and multiple probit. These results are pre-
sented in the last two columns of Tables 3 and 4.
In the second stage regression with the underwriting profit margin
as the dependent variable the coefficient of the instrumental variable
-20-
I, representing the probability of restrictive rate regulatory laws,
is significant and negative. Based on capture theory, a positive value
is expected. Thus, capture theory is contradicted by this analysis
(Table 5).
Urbanization is positively correlated with the underwriting profit
margin, contradicting the results expected by Joskow's theory of regu-
lation. Consumers do not take advantage of the ability to develop a
coalition easily in urban areas to lower homeowners insurance premiums.
However, Joskow's theory is supported by the positive coefficient for
the concentration ratio. Insurers do take advantage of their greater
concentration to lobby for higher rates.
The direct writers' market share is negatively correlated with the
underwriting profit margin. This result suggests that direct writers,
whose marketing methods allow them to have a lower expense ratio, may
be willing to accept a lower level of profitability than independent
agency insurers.
The dummy variable signifying that the insurance commissioner is
elected, as opposed to appointed, is highly significant and positive.
The underwriting profit margin is, on the average, 10.3 percentage
points higher in states with an elected insurance commissioner than in
states with appointed insurance commissioner. This result can be inter-
preted as support for capture theory, in which the insurance industry
trades its political support to candidates for economic benefits. Al-
though in most states in which the insurance commissioner is appointed
an elected official makes the appointment, this result demonstrates
that the insurance industry is more successful in winning benefits
-21-
in states with elected insurance commissioners than in states with
appointed insurance commissioners. This phenomenon may be explained
by the occurrence of fundraising from the insurance industry by can-
didates for the office of insurance commissioners as reported for
r
26
Georgia.
The three prior employment classifications used in this regression,
insurance industry, public sector, and academic, are all negatively
correlated with the underwriting profit margin. Also, no significant
differences exist among the three coefficients. This result contra-
dicts the employment pattern theory of regulation as commissioners with
an insurance background are not regulating the industry in a manner to
produce greater profitability.
The coefficients of inflation, population growth rate, percentage
of the population over age 65, post employment classification, and
employment orientation of the insurance commissioner are not significant
The results of the second stage least squares regression and the con-
clusions drawn from them are summarized in Table 5.
The results of the second stage multiple probit shown in Table 4
and summarized in Table 5 indicate that the population growth rate is
negatively correlated with the probability of a state adopting a restric-
tive rate regulatory law. This result is expected based on analysis.
The three firm concentration ratio is positively correlated with the
probability of a state adopting a restrictive rate regulatory law.
Direct writers' market share is negatively correlated with restrictive
rate regulatory laws as expected based on analysis.
-22-
The dummy variable indicating that the insurance commissioner is
elected is positively correlated with the probability of a state adopt-
ing a restrictive rate regulatory law. Referring back to the influence
of this variable on profitability, this relationship suggests that if
the office of insurance commissioner is elective the state is more
likely to have a restrictive rate regulatory law (from the second stage
multiple probit) and the elected commissioner is likely to administer
the rating law to benefit the insurance industry (from the second stage
regression). The only other significant coefficient is the natural log
of the number of years the insurance commissioner has been in office
which is negatively correlated with the probability of a state adopting
a restrictive rate regulatory law.
Peltzman's theory of regulation hypothesizes that the regulator
acts to buffer profitability shifts. The subdivision of the sample into
profitable and unprofitable years allows testing of this hypothesis.
The years in which homeowners' insurers achieved an underwriting profit
on national experience were 1973, 1976, 1977, and 1978, with the
remaining years generating underwriting losses. The analysis on the
subdivided data was performed by the same procedure as used for the
entire sample, with instrumental variables determined by first stage
regression and multiple probit, and incorporated into second stage
27
runs.
Peltzman's theory would be supported if the coefficient for restric-
tive regulation, I, were negative in profitable years and positive
in unprofitable years. This coefficient is negative in both periods,
-23-
-6.651 (T-ratio of 2.081) for profitable years and -30.236 (T-ratio of
2.418) for unprofitable years, contradicting this theory.
Private Passenger Automobile Insurance Results
Private passenger automobile insurance is the major line written by
property-liability insurers, producing three times the premium volume
of homeowners insurance in 1980. Effects of regulation may be observable
for auto insurance that do not appear to be significant for homeowners
insurance. Private passenger automobile insurance is also more visible
to the public with a larger number of insureds and greater legal compul-
sion to insure. A comparison of similarities and differences in observ-
able effects of regulation for the different lines indicates the circum-
stances under which the theories of regulation apply or are contradicted.
The simultaneous equations system was run for private passenger
automobile experience for the period 1973 through 1980, providing a
28
potential sample size of 408. The insurance commissioner could not
be classified in 39 cases and the underwriting profit margin for Kentucky
in 1975 was missing from the NAIC data, reducing the sample size to
368.
The results of the first and second stage regressions are included
in Table 6 and the first and second stage multiple probits are shown in
Table 7. In the second stage regressions, the coefficient of I is not
significant, thus neither supporting nor contradicting capture theory.
The coefficient of the inflation rate is positive, contradicting the
analysis (Table 8). Although the underwriting profit margin and the
inflation rate are positively correlated, inclusion of dummy variables
-24-
for each year removes the effect of the average inflation rate in a
year, leaving only difference among states. States with higher infla-
tion rates tended to have higher profitability.
The coefficient of the percent of population residing in urban
areas is negative, supporting Joskow's theory. The coefficient of the
three firm concentration ratio is not significant, neither supporting
nor contradicting Joskow's theory. The coefficient of the direct
writers' market share is positive, contradicting the homeowners' results,
and indicating that, for private passenger automobile insurance greater
market share by direct writers increases, rather than decreases, profit-
ability.
The coefficient of the dummy variable representing that the insur-
ance commissioner is elected is negative, with states electing the
insurance commissioner having an underwriting profit margin 1.7 percen-
tage points lower than states with appointed insurance commissioners.
This result contradicts capture theory. The coefficients of the post
employment classification of public sector and the employment orienta-
tion of the insurance commissioner are negative, indicating that the
insurance commissioners moving to pubic sector employment or treating
the position as permanent reduce profitability, supporting the employ-
ment pattern theory.
Only three coefficients of the second stage multiple probit are
significant. The coefficient of the dummy variable representing that
the insurance commissioner is elected is positive, the coefficient of
the natural log of the number of years the insurance commissioner has
been in office is negative, and the coefficient of the post employment
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classification public sector is positive. As shown in Table 8, none of
the results are conclusive.
The automobile experience is subdivided into profitable and unpro-
fitable years to test Peltzman's theory of regulation. The four profit-
able years for the private passenger automobile insurance industry
countrywide during the sample period are 1973, 1977, 1978, and 1980,
with the industry experiencing significant underwriting losses in the
remaining years.
Peltzman's theory of regulation is supported by automobile
insurance experience. The coefficient of 1 is -0.575 (T-ratio of
0.519) for profitable years and 6.880 (T-ratio of 2.456) for unprofit-
able years. Although strict regulation has no significant effect on
profitability in profitable years, restrictive rate regulation
increased profitability in unprofitable years.
Conclusion
Capture theory proposes that profitability would be higher in states
with restrictive regulation. The results of solving the simultaneous
system of equations contradict this proposition for homeowners and are
not significant for automobile insurance. Capture theory also proposes
that profitability would be higher in states with elected insurance com-
missioners. This condition is supported for homeowners but contradicted
for automobile insurance. Thus, of four tests of this theory one find-
ing supports it, two results contradict it, and one is indeterminate.
Capture theory does not apply in general to the insurance industry.
Joskow's minimization of conflict theory is tested by expecting
profitability to increase with industry concentration and decrease with
-26-
urbanization, reflecting the relative ease with which interest groups
could organize. The concentration ratio is, as expected, positively
correlated with profitability for homeowners but insignificant for
automobile insurance. Urbanization is, as expected, negatively corre-
lated with profitability for automobile insurance, but contradicting
expected results, positively correlated with homeowners' profitability.
Thus, Joskow's theory is supported in two cases, contradicted in one,
and indeterminate in one.
Peltzman's theory that regulators buffer profitability cycles
is supported by automobile insurance experience but contradicted by
homeowners experience. The employment pattern theory of regulation
hypothesis that regulators coming from or going to the regulated
industry regulate to increase profitability is never supported. For
homeowners insurance prior employment in the insurance industry reduces
profitability whereas post employment in the insurance industry has an
insignificant coefficient. For automobile insurance both coefficients
are insignificant. The hypothesis that regulators moving on to other
public sector employment reduce profitability is supported for automo-
bile experience but insignificant for homeowners. The career employ-
ment orientation of regulators reduces automobile insurance profit-
ability but has an insignificant effect for homeowners. Thus, employ-
ment factors do affect regulation, but the concern that industry
employment increases industry profits is unsupported.
None of the tested theories adequately explains property-liability
insurance regulation based on tests of automobile and homeowners insur-
ance. Several differences between these two lines may explain, in part,
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the divergent findings and suggest additional considerations in revising
regulatory theories. Automobile insurance is a more widely purchased
coverage than homeowners, so more voters would be concerned with auto-
mobile insurance rates than homeowners rates. Thus, elected insurance
commissioners could be "captured" for homeowners regulation but not for
automobile insurance. Also, industry interest groups, proxied by con-
centration, could influence homeowners regulation more than automobile
insurance regulation. As most insurers write both automobile and home-
owners insurance, regulators may be reducing profitability on the more
visible line but allowing the industry to recoup the losses imposed on
automobile insurance through homeowners pricing. This behavior would
fit both Joskow's minimization of conflict theory and Peltzman's maximi-
zation of political support theory.
Another difference between the two lines is that homeowners is more
subject to catastrophe exposure than automobile insurance as natural
disasters can produce extremely unprofitable results for a given year.
Automobile profitability is more consistent from year to year. A
result of this difference would be that restrictive regulation for
automobile insurance would immediately affect profitability and, thus,
generate pressure from the industry. Restrictive regulation of home-
owners insurance might only lower the margin for catastrophe exposures,
which would produce losses only in years with catastrophic experience.
Also, unprofitable years for homeowners are primarily the result of
fortuitous events instead of regulatory influence. Thus, the degree
of predictability of losses may affect regulatory processes.
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The property-liability insurance industry offers fertile grounds
for testing regulatory theories as a result of imposing divergent state
regulatory systems on an essentially national industry. Significant
differences between lines of business can test the general applicability
of these theories. Current theories of regulation only partially
explain regulatory behavior in this industry.
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Table 1
Definitions of Variables
UPM = underwriting profit margin
REG = 1 for restrictive rate regulatory law; otherwise
INF = change in Consumer Price Index for the region applicable
to the state
PG = population growth rate
URB = percent of population living in metropolitan areas
PCIA = per capita income adjusted for inflation
OV65 = percent of population aged 65 and over
YTH = percent of motor vehicle operators under age 25
CR = three firm concentration ratio
DWMS = direct writers' market share
EL = 1 if the insurance commissioner is elected; otherwise
LNEXP = natural log of number of years the insurance commissioner
has been in office
PREII = 1 if the insurance commissioner has worked in the insurance
industry; otherwise
PREPUB = 1 if the insurance commissioner has worked in the public
sector; otherwise
PREAC = 1 if the insurance commissioner came from academia;
otherwise
POSTII = 1 if the insurance commissioner moved to a position in
the insurance industry; otherwise
POSTPUB = 1 if the insurance commissioner moved to a position in
government; otherwise
Table 1 (continued)
CAREER = 1 if the insurance commissioner is a career employee of
the insurance department; otherwise
YRXX = 1 for 19XX; otherwise
Subscripts
s indicates an individual state value
r indicates a regional value
Table 2
Data Summary
Sample Period 1973-1980
General Standard
Variables Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
INF 8.86 2.49 5.50 12.60
PG 1.33 1.86 -3.09 13.82
URB 59.86 24.66 0.00 100.00
OV65 10.49 2.08 2.40 18.10
YTH* 22.73 2.50 16.20 31.60
PCIA 48.07 7.41 31.61 76.47
EL 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00
LNEXP 1.14 0.80 0.00 3.61
PREII 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00
PREPUB 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00
PREAC 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00
POSTII 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00
POSTPUB 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00
CAREER 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00
Homeowners Variables
UPM -0.37
REG 0.57
CR 33.35
DWMS 37.72
Automobile Variables
UPM
REG
CR
DWMS
19.75 -172.80 34.60
0.50 0.00 1.00
10.43 16.50 79.00
10.96 10.60 69.80
-1.13 6.13 -31.00 16.00
0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00
34.57 6.54 19.45 52.70
44.14 10.88 16.74 73.60
*does not include 1976.
Table 3
First and Second Stage Multiple Regression
Homeowners Underwriting Profit Margin, 1973-1980
First Stage
Dependent Variable UPM
Constructed Variable UPM
Second Stage
Dependent Variable UPM
Variable Coefficient T-Ratio Coefficient T-Ratio
Constant -16.005 -0.953 30.830 2.007*
I — — -13.549 -2.765*
INF 0.378 0.215 0.039 0.022
PG 2.367 3.710* 0.283 0.301
URB 0.024 0.474 0.123 2.750*
OV65 -0.257 -0.418 -0.625 -1.035
PCIA 0.665 3.796* — —
CR 0.019 0.113 0.785 2.659*
DWMS -0.265 -1.564 -0.999 -3.568*
EL 5.240 1.860* 10.315 3.218*
LNEXP 1.706 1.245 — —
PREII -9.512 -1.868* -23.332 -2.916*
PREPUB -7.901 -1.602 -19.767 -2.670*
PREAC -9.261 -1.322 -28.707 -2.580*
POSTII -0.893 -0.347 2.149 0.785
POSTPUB 0.666 0.209 1.308 0.397
CAREER -0.919 -0.388 1.987 0.855
YR74 . -13.310 -1.369 -11.079 -1.133
YR75 -12.130 -1.790* -10.031 -1.470
YR76 -0.277 -0.069 1.754 0.429
Table 3 (continued)
YR77 0..236 0.574
YR78 0,,976 0.194
YR79 -9..103 -0.920
YR80 -21,.102 -1.831*
»2 a .R adjusted .162
Sample Size 369
Degrees» of Fre:edom 346
Durbin-Watson 1 .748
6.193 1.510
7.703 1.552
0.218 -0.022
•8.020 -0.695
.146
369
347
1.717
*Significant at the 5 percent (one tailed) level.
Table 4
First and Second Stage Multiple Probit
Homeowners Underwriting Profit Margin, 1973-1980
First
Dependent }
Constructed
Stage
/ariable I
Variable I
Variable MLE MLE/SE
Constant 2.077 1.57
UPM — —
INF 0.015 0.11
?G -0.142 -2.96*
URB 0.003 0.75
OV65 -0.002 -0.04
PCIA -0.020 -1.54
CR 0.050 3.33*
DWMS -0.048 -3.69*
EL 0.392 1.88*
LNEXP -0.251 -2.49*
PREII -1.108 -2.00*
PREPUB -0.990 -1.81*
PREAC -1.533 -2.34*
POSTII 0.199 1.06
POSTPUB 0.105 0.44
CAREER 0.279 1.59
YR74 -0.004 -0.01
YR75 0.062 0.12
YR76 0.112 0.38
Second Stage
Dependent Variable I
MLE MLE/SE
0.785 1.29
0.006 0.60
-0.119
0.002
0.073
•0.036
0.228
-2.59*
0.50
0.008 -0.62
0.047 3.36*
0.044 -3.67*
0.438 2.25*
0.264 -2.67*
0.48
-0.16
1.43
Table 4 (continued)
YR77
YR78
YR79
YR80
0.152 0.50
0.261 0.71
0.255 0.35
0.508 0.60
MLE = Maximum Likelihood Estimator
SE = Standard Error
*Significant at the 5 percent (one tailed) level
Table 5
Homeowners, 1973-1980
Results of Second Stage Least Squares Regression
Dependent Variable - Underwriting Profit Margin
Variable Expected Sign Based on Actual Sign Conclusion
A
I positive capture negative contradicts
INF negative analysis indeterminate —
PG positive analysis indeterminate —
URB negative Joskow positive contradicts
OV65 negative analysis indeterminate —
CR positive Joskow positive supports
DWMS — — negative —
EL positive capture positive supports
PREII positive employment negative contradicts
PREPUB — — negative —
PREAC — — negative —
POSTII positive employment indeterminate —
POSTPUB negative employment indeterminate —
CAREER positive or
negative
employment indeterminate —
Varia ble Expected S
UPM —
URB
negative
positive
PCIA negative
Results of Second Stage Multiple Probit
Dependent Variable - I
1 Based on Actual Sign
— indeterminate
analysis negative
analysis indeterminate
analysis indeterminate
Conclusion
supports
Table 5 (continued)
CR
DWMS
EL
LNEXP
PREPUB
POSTPUB
CAREER
negative analysis
positive
negative
positive
negative
indeterminate
indeterminate
indeterminate
supports
Table 6
First and Second Stage Multiple Regression
Automobile Insurance Underwriting Profit Margin, 1973-1980
First Stage
Dependent Variable UPMA
Constructed Variable UPM
Second Stage
Dependent Variable UPM
Variable Coefficient T-Ratio Coefficient T-Ratio
Constant 0.696 0.201 -7.618 -1.466
A
I — — 1.601 1.228
INF 1.087 2.429* 1.430 2.857*
PG -0.321 -2.100* -0.253 -1.588
URB -0.061 -5.048* -0.064 -5.184*
PCIA -0.077 -1.833* — —
CR -0.013 -0.189 -0.024 -0.328
DWMS 0.123 2.490* 0.150 2.520*
EL -1.027 -1.491 -1.723 -1.880*
LNEXP -0.147 -0.420 — —
PREII -0.686 -0.536 1.243 0.577
PREPUB -0.250 -0.201 1.751 0.798
PREAC -1.186 -0.659 0.276 0.118
POSTII -0.242 -0.362 -0.661 -0.900
POSTPUB -1.085 -1.368 -1.874 -1.768*
CAREER -0.973 -1.655* -1.078 -1.996*
YR74 -8.576 -3.445* -10.164 -3.751*
YR75 -16.186 -9.265* -17.268 -9.130*
YR76 -4.671 -4.652* -4.474 -4.376*
Table 6 (continued)
YR77
YR78
YR79
YR80
2
R adjusted
Sample Size
Degrees of Freedom
Durbin-Watson
-2.756 -2.581*
-4.743 -3.802*
-10.431 -4.226*
-9.341
.430
368
-3.254*
ra 346
1 .001
-3.224 -2.887*
-5.490 -4.373*
•12.695 -4.528*
-12.081 -3.640*
.429
368
347
1.003
*Significant at the 5 percent (one tailed) level
Table 7
First and Second Stage Multiple Probit
Automobile Insurance Underwriting Profit Margin, 1973-1980
First Stage Second Stage
Dependent }Variable I
Constructed Variable I Dependent Variable I
Variable MLE MLE/SE MLE MLE/SE
Constant 3.904 3.583* 2.019 3.304*
UPM — — -0.003 -0.137
INF -0.166 -1.290 — —
?G -0.034 -0.804 -0.036 -0.903
URB -0.002 -0.623 -0.002 -0.595
PCIA -0.018 -1.586 -0.016 -1.398
CR 0.150 0.754 -0.003 -0.201
DWMS -0.025 -1.803* -0.015 -1.298
EL 0.507 2.557* 0.461 2.539*
LNEXP -0.236 -2.343* -0.247 -2.507*
PREII -1.230 -2.198* — —
PREPUB -1.298 -1.809* -0.198 -1.316
PREAC -0.979 -1.441 — —
POSTII 0.253 1.350 — —
POSTPUB 0.501 2.168* 0.394 1.821*
CAREER 0.166 0.977 0.091 0.570
YR74 0.788 1.108 — —
YR75 0.562 1.108 — —
YR76 -0.134 -0.470 — —
Table 7 (continued)
YR77
YR78
YR79
YR80
0.262 0.861
0.270 0.751
0.104 1.553
1.342 1.630
MLE = Maximum Likelihood Estimator
SE = Standard Error
^Significant at the 5 percent (one tailed) level
Table 8
Automobile, 1973-1980
Results of Second Stage Least Squares Regression
Dependent Variable - Underwriting Profit Margin
Variable Expected Sign Based on Actual Sign Conclusion
I positive capture indeterminate —
INF negative analysis positive contradicts
PG negative analysis indeterminate —
URB negative Joskow negative supports
CR positive Joskow indeterminate —
DWMS — — positive —
EL positive capture negative contradicts
PREII positive employment indeterminate —
PREPUB — — indeterminate —
PREAC — — indeterminate —
POSTII positive employment indeterminate —
POSTPUB negative employment negative supports
CAREER positive or
negative
employment negative supports
Variable
UPM
?G
URB
PCIA
Results of Second Stage Multiple Probit
Dependent Variable - I
Expected Sign Based on Actual Sign
—
— indeterminate
negative
positive
negative
analysis indeterminate
analysis indeterminate
analysis indeterminate
Conclusion
Table 8 (continued)
CR —- — indeterminat
DWMS negative analysis indeterminat
EL — — positive
LNEXP — — negative
PREPUB — — indeterminate
POSTPUB — — positive
CAREER __ — indeterminate



